

1/20/2002 12:26 PM

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SEABORN! *Noe discussions*

TO PUT IN

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1. DE/McNamara on Limited Nuclear War ⁴(must not be told⁴): see Halberstam, B&B
 2. DE/McGeorge Bundy: Delegation (Lieutenant Kennedy: illustrative of struggle with JCS, covert: specifically, with LeMay (see 1964; 1968; his leaks to Goldwater; my responses; issue of 1964 campaign, arms race and delegation: still, difference between LBJ and Goldwater, though also similarity, hidden to public, compromise with JCS) (this struggle is related to, but separate from, issue of war with China: toughness, arms race, arms budget (still, with Clinton, Bush); Iwakuni? First-strike plans; see JSCP;
 3. DE/Gilpatric: Questions; Komer—Japanese generals [NSSM-1]; Tic Bonesteel to hsr: Did you have anything to do with these questions? Gilpatric to me:
 4. Later on NSSM-1: Vann on questions: to me; to Mission Council.
 5. On NSSM-1: end of attrition, cross-over point (questions); Cambodia added (Nixon on Cambodia, January?); study on Haiphong [ASK HALPERIN] [AND when he learned of frogmen; learned of Cambodia by accident); OTHER QUESTIONS IN NSSM-1
 6. Why Rogers and Laird were cut out of Oval Office; they argued; HAK did not. (decent interval) (Probably no discussion of this on tapes at all; never uttered by Nixon, probably not by HAK in Nixon's presence; ASK HALPERIN: How then did he get by with arguing this to DRV and Dobrynin? Send him comments on Berman?)

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JCS / Rusk / Whelan on arms

Chap. III: JCS / LBJ on mole, China, arms
(Rusk, Rusk vs. McN)

TO PUT IN

1. Halberstam B&B 243: DE/McNamara on Limited Nuclear War (must not be told): see

Halberstam, B&B; Yarmolinsky.¹

2. DE/McGeorge Bundy: Delegation (Lieutenant Kennedy: illustrative of struggle with JCS, covert: specifically, with LeMay (see 1964; 1968; his leaks to Goldwater; my responses; issue of 1964 campaign, arms race and delegation: still, difference between LBJ and Goldwater, though also similarity, hidden to public, compromise with JCS) (this struggle is related to, but separate from, issue of war with China: toughness, arms race, arms budget (still, with Clinton, Bush); Iwakuni?

First-strike plans; see JSCP;

different getting (Wf? nature of FS plan, SU-China, FULTES NATO)

see McN/IR
on JCS and nuclear war
before of Rusk

Need for Plan to see JSCP
+ UN
= Congress to see PP (war power)

(Public don't
JSCP only focused on NATO (FS),
NOT ON

3. DE/Gilpatric: Questions; Komer—Japanese generals [NSSM-1]; Tic Bonesteel to hsr: Did you

have anything to do with these questions? Gilpatric to me:

"DETECTING"
SU SURPRISE
ATTACK;
AND ON

4. Later on NSSM-1: Vann on questions: to me; to Mission Council.

5. On NSSM-1: end of attrition, cross-over point (questions); Cambodia added (Nixon on Cambodia, January?); study on Haiphong [ASK HALPERIN] [AND when he learned of frogmen; learned of Cambodia by accident); OTHER QUESTIONS IN NSSM-1

6. Why Rogers and Laird were cut out of Oval Office; they argued; HAK did not. (decent interval)

(Probably no discussion of this on tapes at all; never uttered by Nixon, probably not by HAK in

my goal: not a public uprising — but 1) N to unload war on Doves
forced in 91-72 or 2) Congress to take responsibility (NCSG-4)

TW: anon. staffers with influence: not on war policy: Frank + McHenry; IG/NOV-
Enthorn, Komer, (Komer?) Skruppean Komer (now, Franklin —); ANCE
(hsr)
OTHERS' LACK OF COMPARABLE
CONCERN REFLECTS ENFORCED.
my "boasty": not to influence of importance or influence: but to coming of concern
and its dependence on SECRET, LITTLE-KNOWN
PLANS, HISTORY